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A scalable framework for automatically deploying locally (or remotely) a number of virtual machines that
replicate a Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) network is proposed. This includes multiple
virtual hosts emulating sensors and actuators, with a Human Machine Interface (HMI) controlling the hosts.
The presented framework contains a collection of automation scripts which build and deploy a variable
number of virtual machines, pre-configured to act as either a Remote Terminal Unit (RTU), HMI or Data
Historian. The presented work includes a standards compliant implementation of IEC 60870-5-104 (IEC104)
and OPC Unified Architecture (OPC-UA), with the capability to support other protocols such as Modbus-TCP
(Modbus) and IEC61850. This allows researchers to build testbeds that can be configured to replicate real-
world deployments of SCADA networks. The framework builds upon open source libraries and is released
under the Free Software Foundation approved licence, GNU General Public License version 3.
Keywords: Dataset, ICS, IEC 60870-5-104, OPC Unified Architecture, Open-Source, SCADA, TestBed
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper describes a framework and set of tools to
enable the creation and deployment of a virtualised
SCADA testbed. It defines eight requirements for
an Industrial Control System (ICS) testbed, and
investigates four possible use cases for the proposed
framework. The purpose and contribution of this
work is to address the lack of SCADA testbeds,
and datasets available to the research community.
Finally, this work provides a sample dataset
created using the framework, that can be used for
verifying network Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
and other research experiments that require an
openly accessible and reproducible dataset for ICS
research.
Critical systems are becoming increasingly inter-
connected, with new targeted threats to Operational
Technology (OT) being identified regularly. It is im-
portant to understand these threats in order to de-
velop effective countermeasures. Testbed networks
are used to analyse threats to ICS/SCADA systems,
and to verify the effectiveness of countermeasures,
though there is a lack of open testbeds that can fa-
cilitate this. One might consider taking advantage of
a live SCADA site for identifying threats and verifying
countermeasures. While this might be fine for enter-
prise systems, it is not for ICS, due to their critical
nature. Many operators and vendors are unwilling
to deploy untrusted and unproven components onto
their networks. Another issue with using live data is
anonymising packet contents. Anonymising captured
packets is not as simple as replacing IP headers.
Identifiable information can be stored in many loca-
tions, for example, a telnet session or within NetBIOS
packets. These fields may leak internal IP address
ranges, naming standards and MAC address that
can uniquely identify vendor equipment and hard-
ware configurations, and can potentially identify an
industrial site with a high degree of confidence. Ex-
isting ICS testbeds have been built to replicate real
industrial sites, that focus on specific network proto-
cols and use physical hardware to replicate a real
world process. While this can provide researchers
with a realistic dataset replicating real world sites,
it does not address other domains and commu-
nication protocols. Typically such testbeds are not
reproducible by researchers and usage of them is
authorised strictly by their owners, which inhibits sci-
entific innovation. The need for an open reproducible
testbed framework becomes clear when developing
novel systems for ICSs. An example is Wang et al.
(2016) who developed a Hierarchical online IDS for
c© Maynard et al. Published by
BCS Learning and Development Ltd.
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SCADA networks, which they verified using KDD99
and the Mississippi State University datasets Mor-
ris et al. (2011). The KDD99 dataset often used
for verifying IDS, discussed in Gowadiya and Jain
(2015), is nearly twenty years old, thus technology
and threats have changed since the dataset was
released. The Mississippi State University provides
access to packet captures upon request and despite
being a sophisticated, accessible dataset, it is not re-
producible unless one purchases the physical equip-
ment, and gains an understanding of the process.
It is difficult to quantitatively compare between IDS
approaches for ICS, due to a lack of open and di-
verse datasets which can be used to emulate various
use cases and protocols. While not all testbeds use
physical ICS hardware, it is common to find testbeds
which emulate network architecture and simulate
process data. Using network emulation software to
emulate the network adds an additional complexity
to the deployment of a testbed, as the researcher will
have to understand how to configure it, and may not
interact with existing physical infrastructure. It also
reduces the testbed’s ability to accurately represent
ICS fidelity, and prevents innovation of the underlying
network infrastructure. Domain fidelity is the ability of
a testbed to mimic a real Industrial Control System
system as close and accurately as possible, defined
in Green et al. (2017).
To address this challenge, we present an open
framework for deploying SCADA testbed networks
intended for use by researchers. The framework
has been implemented and the source code is
available for public access under a Free Software
Foundation approved licence, GNU General Public
License v3. The framework presented in this paper
provides a flexible foundation for use in many
applications, e.g. Smart-Grid, Power Generation and
Distribution, control of gas and oil infrastructure,
etc. Existing testbeds tend to focus on emulated
networks communicating via Modbus, while the
framework currently supports IEC104 and OPC-UA,
with scope for other protocols such as Modbus
and IEC61850. It also supports interaction with
both emulated and physical networks, along with
simulated processes and physical hardware.
The paper is broken down into: related work
discussing the existing literature of ICS testbeds; four
use cases supported by the framework; followed by
an overview of the framework and what it currently
consists of; then a review of the published dataset
and testbed deployment steps; Finally it concludes
with a discussion of ongoing work.
Contributions: This paper proposes a novel open
source framework, for creating, deploying and
managing SCADA testbeds. It discusses the desired
features of a testbed, along with four use cases
of the framework. Finally, the paper presents a
150 minute packet capture produced using the
framework, generated with a configuration consisting
of five RTUs, a HMI and a Data Historian. The virtual
nodes are controlled and monitored with IEC104 and
OPC-UA.
2. RELATED WORK
A number of existing publications address the issue
of testbeds for SCADA systems, either directly or
indirectly. This section will discuss literature which
solely proposes and discusses an ICS testbed, or
created one as a by-product of their experiments.
Many testbeds attempt to strike a balance between
network functionality and accurately representing a
high level of ICS domain fidelity. Davis et al. (2006)
used a high voltage power systems simulator called
Power World Simulator1, and combined it with the
network and attack emulator RINSE, described in
Liljenstam et al. (2005), to create a SCADA testbed.
Davis used the field bus protocol Modbus to interface
with the process simulator, then performed and
analysed the effects of a network based Denial of
Service (DOS) attack. This paper highlights the need
for SCADA testbeds to clearly understand the effects
of such attacks on critical infrastructure, and how
they might affect the processes being controlled.
The use of the network emulator RINSE allows for
a large scale real-time human/machine-in-the-loop
network simulation of attack and defence techniques,
which would require extensive physical equipment
and expertise if built from scratch. These types of
experiments are desired for developing modern ICS
testbeds, with a focus on network infrastructure.
However, using network emulators lowers the level
of domain fidelity that can be represented due to the
limitation of the emulators, to accurately represent
a real network. Another testbed was proposed by
Mallouhi et al. (2011) designed for analysing the
security of SCADA control systems. They again
use both Power World Simulator and Modbus. They
performed a DOS and Man-in-the-middle based
attacks, sending illegal Modbus commands and
perform TCP based SYN and ACK flooding. Mallouhi
used the network simulator OPNET2, which restricts
the level of fidelity and the testbeds’s ability to
interact with physical devices and networks.
Chromik et al. (2017) used the Mosaik3 smart-
grid simulator to simulate the power distribution
1Power World Simulator - https://www.powerworld.com/
products/simulator/overview/
2OPNET Network Simulator - http://opnetprojects.com/
opnet-network-simulator/
3Mosaik - https://mosaik.offis.de/
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network and the control network, running Modbus-
TCP. They proposed a decentralised process-aware
monitoring system using the Bro IDS. Using process
simulators allows for quick deployment of multiple
types of devices and supports different use cases.
There is a drawback of using the Mosaik simulator
when performing the security checks defined in the
RTU logic, resulting in a non-negligible delay when
a change is passed between mutually dependent
simulators. The advantage is that it can be used
alongside physical hardware. Alves et al. (2016)
examines the fidelity of a virtual SCADA testbed
and a physical testbed. They study the effects
of an attack to both testbeds. Then compare the
outcome of both virtual and physical. They simulate
a gas pipeline, which involves a Programmable
Logic Controller (PLC) and HMI to maintain the
pressure inside the simulated pipe. Simulink/Matlab
was used to simulate the process data within
the virtual systems. OpenPLC was used in both
testbeds, which is an open source PLC that supports
Modbus and all five IEC61131-3 programming
languages. It was deployed on a Raspberry PI
using an extension board called UniPi. They noticed
a difference in real-time behaviour between the
two PLC deployments. This is due the virtual PLC
running in a hypervisor and scheduling the process
to wakeup at an undefined time. This increases
the maximum deviation of the cycle time to 4.44ms
compared to the physical system delay of 0.3ms.
While it does not affect their experimental simulation
it is an important metric to consider when developing
a testbed.
Reaves and Morris (2012) proposed an open Python
based framework for creating virtual devices and
process simulators, for use in an ICS testbed. They
have virtualused the logic behind the device to
replicate PLC ladder logic. This allows for a more
realistic operation. They also support integration
with physical hardware, and have configured it to
replicate an ICS laboratory configuration, described
in Morris et al. (2011). Unlike other frameworks they
did not use a network simulator such as OPNET
or RINSE, due to the additional complexity they
introduce. They support the use of Modbus-TCP
within the testbed as well as virtual and physical
serial communications. This framework lacks the
support of other protocols such as IEC104 and
OPC-UA, though the authors stated it is possible
to expand to other protocols. Testbeds that use
network emulators and process simulators are quick
and easy to deploy and reproduce. However, they
lack the ability to accurately replicate real world
systems to a high level of domain fidelity. Green
et al. (2017) have created a physical ICS testbed
which supports a number of Siemens and CISCO
devices, and is described in a second paper by the
same authors, Green et al. (2017), along with ten
lessons they learnt while developing and utilising
a SCADA testbed. They performed two attacks on
the testbed, one network based and the other host
based, describing the steps an adversary would
follow if it were a real system. Green highlights the
domain specific knowledge required to compromise
a SCADA system, and how the attacker may gain
this information by interacting with the ICS testbed.
This testbed has a high level of domain fidelity, but is
not easily reproducible without having to purchase a
number of physical devices.
Figure 1: A highlevel architecture diagram of a SCADA
network. Showing a testbeds possible configuration, that
can interact with both virtual and physical devices.
A typical SCADA network is shown in figure 1,
showing the bottom three architecture layers that
can be thought of as: Layer 0 Process; Layer
1 Control; and Layer 2 Supervisory. Figure 1
highlights the possible combinations of physical and
virtual devices. For example, a physical HMI may
communicate with one or more physical PLCs as well
as one or more virtual RTUs.
Cintuglu et al. (2017) have performed a survey of
existing cyber-physical smart-grid testbeds. Based
on their findings they proposed a set of taxonomies
and guidelines for the development of future
testbeds. Also, they identified a set of common
attacks ranging from precision insider, rogue
software to database attack and malformed packets.
Cintuglu focused specifically on smart-grid testbeds
rather than generic SCADA networks, while smart-
grid systems support many of the same fieldbus
protocols (Modbus, DNP3, OPC-UA, IEC16850 and
C37.118) as generic SCADA, the wider literature
lacks work focusing on IEC104.With a combination
of virtual, physical and hybrid testbeds, only a few
allowed external access for researchers. Likewise
many of the testbeds were non-reproducible.
As highlighted in the introduction section there is a
lack of modern ICS datasets. Rodofile et al. (2017)
has defined ten requirements for attack dataset
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creation specific for SCADA networks. These are
listed below:
• R1: Able to parse SCADA protocol messages.
• R2: Able to replicate the SCADA protocol
stack.
• R3: Able to sniff local SCADA network traffic.
• R4: Inject anomalous SCADA protocol mes-
sages into the network.
• R5: Modify protocol message data in real-time.
• R6: Provide a protocol master service for
masquerading.
• R7: Provide a protocol slave service for
masquerading.
• R8: Provide SCADA network discov-
ery/reconnaissance to target SCADA
applications.
• R9: Able to replay previous SCADA protocol
messages.
• R10: Able to flood a SCADA service with
anomalous messages.
However, the requirements proposed by Rodofile
et.al mostly focused on the needs of network based
attacks, that can be performed on traditional IT
such as, Replay, Man-in-the-middle (MITM) and
DOS. They lack the requirements that directly
relate to the operation of a SCADA environment,
e.g. an additional requirement might be the ability
to replicate to a high degree of fidelity a real
world process. The proposed framework’s scope is
focused on the creation of virtualised nodes and
support the interaction with physical networks and
devices, along with process simulators and network
emulators. It addresses the ten points discussed
above, and supports the operation of four use cases,
discussed below.
3. USE CASE
There are a number of reasons for building a testbed.
While this paper does not attempt to discuss them
all, it does propose four common examples which
this framework is capable of supporting: Packet Gen-
eration; Attack Simulations; Agent Benchmarking
and Extending Limited Hardware.
3.1. Packet Generation
The objective of the first use case is to generate
network traffic from a large number of devices,
with a high level of domain fidelity, where ideally
process information would be included in the traffic.
As highlighted earlier, creating datasets from a
live system is not always possible: it is labour
intensive, one needs to locate a suitable tap point
and gain approval from the plant operators. This
may be restricted by the plant operation and policies,
as interference with a working network may lead
to unforeseen circumstances and leak identifiable
information. Packet generation can be used to test
proposed changes to the SCADA network before
being deployed into the live system. It can also
perform stress testing of devices using legitimate
looking packets. Interesting research use-cases
include experimentation with different networking
paradigms, such as Information Centric Networking
(ICN) or IPv6, that have not been applied to ICS
networks.
3.2. Attack Simulations
This case considers simulation of complex attacks on
SCADA systems, and aims to perform risk analysis
of a replicated ICS network, without adversely
affecting the live system. The testbed may be used
by red teams in an attempt to compromise testbed
nodes, whilst analysing the consequence and getting
full packet capture analysis. If they are successful,
the process can be re-performed with additional
countermeasures in place, allowing testing of the
new countermeasures in the context of security and
how it may affect the site processes. The network
captures of the read team exercise can be published
as an open datasets for verifying IDS which can
be reproduced and confirm the results by other
researchers.
3.3. Agent Benchmarking
The objective of this use case is to support the
benchmarking of agent host based systems, which
are typically not performed on live systems due to
vendor restrictions. Unless the agent is trusted by
vendors, it is often prohibited from being deployed,
with a risk of breach of contract. By using a testbed
that accurately represents the real industrial site, it is
possible to monitor the use of agent based software
without causing disruptions. Provided the testbed
is freely modifiable, functionally accurate and can
integrate with physical hardware, it would be possible
to perform a benchmark of the agent.
3.4. Extending Limited Hardware
The final case is to extend an existing physical
testbed to include communication protocols and
configurations which were not possible with the
existing hardware. This could require the use
of network emulators, to extend the networking
equipment, and process simulators, to extend the
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process control equipment. By coupling virtual and
physical hardware together, it is possible to create
a complex and highly realistic testbed, allowing for
large deployments which combine multiple protocols
and devices to be created and analysed. This use
case could be used alongside the others to enhance
their results.
4. THE TESTBED FRAMEWORK
This section introduces the framework and the
technical features that were derived from the
literature review and also integrates the ten points
made by Rodofile et al. (2017) in section 2. The
features are discussed below, and table 1 shows
each of the state-of-the-art testbeds and compares
supported features.
• Reproducible: Is the testbed described in
enough detail which allows it to be re-deployed
and used by another researcher? Or has it
been built using physical equipment and can
only be used in that one location?
• Scalability : Is the testbed able to scale?
Meaning can it support a large arbitrary
number of devices without having to re-design
the system. This supports the large number of
devices seen within a SCADA network.
• Domain Fidelity : What level of ICS domain
fidelity can be represented using the testbed?
A high level of fidelity typically means it uses
physical hardware and is configured in a
realistic manner. A high level of domain fidelity
allows the testbed to support use cases that
require an accurate representation of a SCADA
network.
• Process Simulation: Does the testbed support
the use of process simulators? This allows
the end nodes, in the absence of real data,
to simulate and generate process data that
mimics real process data.
• Network Emulation: Does the testbed support
the use of network emulators? Network emula-
tion creates virtualised network infrastructure,
which might not be possible to achieve using
limited physical equipment. Emulated networks
allow for configuration of different scenarios
such as packet delay and loss, which would be
harder to create on physical networks.
• Physical Network: Can the testbed be inte-
grated with physical network infrastructure, or
does it only support a specific interface? Phys-
ical infrastructure compared to virtualised, acts
in a different manner and allows interaction
with existing devices.
• Physical Devices: Does it support the interfac-
ing with physical ICS equipment, which allows
for a higher level of fidelity? Like physical net-
works it is hard to virtualise all the nuances
associated with a device.
• Multi-Protocol: Does the testbed support more
than one field bus protocol, or plans to support
more in the future? Supporting a range of
protocols can more accurately represent a
SCADA network, as it is common for networks
to consist of many devices from different
vendors, which support multiple protocols.
Table 1: A table showing a comparison of state-of-the-art
testbed features against this proposed framework. High
(H) Medium (M).
4.1. Overview of Framework
The framework is a collection of scripts which deploy
and configure virtual machines (Nodes) for use in a
SCADA testbed. It is not tied to a specific vendor
or technology, and containerisation can be used
instead of virtulisation if desired. The choice of
operating system and architecture is configurable.
By Default Oracle Virtual Box is used to create the
testbed nodes, supporting two networking options,
1) internal virtualised network provided by virtualbox,
or 2) bridging the node to the hosts network
interface. Both have their advantages and can
be used for different use cases, e.g. to interact
with existing network infrastructure or a network
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Figure 2: Communication diagram of the three main stages of the framework.
emulators, one would use the second option to
bridge the node to the host interface. Since the
testbeds can interact with physical infrastructure,
it supports interoperability with industrial hardware,
such as PLCs and RTUs. The presented version
of the framework supports IEC104 and OPC-UA
allowing native communication, with scope of adding
additional protocols. None of the testbeds reviewed
explicitly supports IEC104, despite the protocol’s
wide usage throughout Europe and Asia. This may
be attributed to a lack of accessible libraries for
IEC104 compared to other protocols. This framework
currently uses the well known implementation of
IEC104, OpenMUC4 as it is compatible with the
GPL licence, unlike other implementations such as
IndigoSCADA5, which is distributed with a non Free
Software Foundation approved licence.
Two terms which will be used throughout the
remainder of the paper are: Operation Profile
and Configuration Profile. Essentially there is a
set of scripts which configure how each node
is provisioned and how they interact with each
other. Operation profile defines the deployment of
nodes, simulators and configuration of the network,
while a configuration profile, defines how a node
should be configured to represent a certain system.
e.g. HMI or RTU. The purpose of having these
profiles, is to encourage the community to contribute
their own profiles that represents their use cases,
4OpenMUC - https://www.openmuc.org/openmuc/
5IndigoSCADA - http://www.enscada.com/a7khg9/
IndigoSCADA.html
while reducing the level of complexity required to
design and deploy a testbed. Figure 2 shows a
communication diagram of the three stages of the
framework: a) Compilation Stage; b) Orchestration
Stage; and the c) Operation Stage. The remainder
of this section discuses each stage in turn.
4.1.1. Compilation Stage
The compilation stage has two goals, the first is to
compile the required software, and second is to build
a base image. Each testbed node is essentially a
subclass of the base image, allowing for each node
to have a common set of features which can be
extended upon to realise their configuration profile.
The compilation stage will compile all software
needed during the lifetime of the testbed, and
compilation is performed in a dedicated, clean and
reproducible virtual environment. This is to ensure
that each node is reproducible and the binary
output is not adversely affected by external factors,
or issues with the host machines. This stage is
a pre-requisite for the other stages, which the
Orchestration and Operation stages rely upon.
4.1.2. Orchestration Stage
Once the software has been compiled and there are
no failed tests, it is possible to run the orchestration
stage. This stage initialises and starts a defined
number of nodes. Based on the operational profile,
each node has their own configuration profile. It
onboards the new nodes and performs network
address assignment. If it is the first boot of the node,
it will be provisioned with the required packages
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based on the configuration profile. Otherwise, a
previously initialised node will be used and activated.
4.1.3. Operation Stage
After the other stages have completed, the testbed
will be in a full working state. This stage allows the
operators to manage, control and interact with the
nodes, as well as initiate a graceful shut down of
the testbed. What exactly is performed at this stage
depends on the individual use case. All nodes on
the network are now communicating as per their
respective configuration profiles.
The framework supports an expert in the ICS do-
main, to design and deploy a testbed with a high level
of domain fidelity. To address the level of domain
fidelity which can be represented by a testbed, the
framework provides the flexibility to integrate process
simulators and network emulators depending on
their requirements, while simultaneously support-
ing interaction with physical infrastructure. Currently,
support for process simulators and network emula-
tors is out of the scope of this framework, however
process simulators can easily be integrated into the
framework, allowing each node to have its own simu-
lator. The reason behind this is to allow for a flexible
framework that can be used for a range of use
cases, without having to explicitly define a network
or process simulator, but also facilitating the ability to
use these programs within a testbed. The framework
addresses the issue of scalability in a number of
ways: 1) It can be integrated into existing network
infrastructure; 2) It supports deployment of nodes
locally on one or more hosts, or on cloud platforms;
3) It uses virtual machines, via the Oracle VM Vir-
tualBox6 hypervisor; 4) It uses open source protocol
libraries which are fully standards compliant.
5. EXAMPLE SETUP
The example scenario is a common metering
application, that can be found in gas and water
monitoring networks, in which a sensor is routinely
interrogated and a value is returned. To add
a bit of variety into the network traffic, a data
historian is included using OPC-UA. The example
testbed consists of seven virtulised nodes, created
using three configuration profiles: 1) HMI; 2) Data
historian; 3) RTUx5. Once all the nodes are built
and brought online, the HMI initiates communication
using the IEC104 protocol to each of the five RTUs
at a specified polling interval and facilitates the
control of the nodes. The Data Historian also initiates
communication, but via OPC-UA, and stores the
data in a local database. This is connected up
using physical infrastructure, a CISCO switch is
used to route the packets and DHCP and DNS is
6Oracle VM VirtualBox - https://www.virtualbox.org/
Figure 3: Network diagram showing a sample testbed,
combining physical and virtual components.
supported by a separate physical device. Figure 3
shows the network diagram of this operation profile.
The virtual nodes are deployed onto two physical
machines. NIST SP 800-82r2, Stouffer et al. (2015)
recommends an ICS security architecture, which
includes network segmentation, boundary protection
and the use of Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) for
separation between enterprise network and SCADA
network. Currently the framework only supports a
two-zone system (no DMZ), this will be addressed
in future versions to allow the use of a three-zone
design, placing the RTUs in the SCADA network and
the data historian inside a DMZ.
The HMI node has a Command Line Interface
(CLI), which shows the status of each connected
device, and can be configured manually via the CLI,
or load a local configuration file, which sets the
polling interval and operational commands. When
the testbed is operational, packets will be routed
between nodes via the switch and from the virtual
machine host. This provides the operator with three
points to monitor network traffic: 1) On the hypervisor
machines, guaranteed to capture any packets sent
to, or generated by the virtual machines; 2) On each
virtual machine, this can provide a more targeted
tap; 3) Span port of the network switch, which will
capture all packets on the network. This has a
drawback depending on the size of the network as
packets may be dropped.
6. SAMPLE DATASET
The testbed used for the creation of the dataset7,
takes full advantage of the framework. It auto
deploys two primary services: an HMI and Historian
7Access the dataset at: https://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.
figshare.6133457.v1
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Table 2: A table showing the number of packets per-host broken down by type of protocol.
along with five RTUs. The HMI is configured every
five seconds to query each of the five RTUs using
IEC104. First the HMI will send an interrogation
command, C IC NA 1 which triggers the RTU to
return with a M ME NB 1 containing one information
object containing the value of the simulated reading.
This dataset only uses a basic process simulator,
as it is designed to show what the framework can
achieve in its current state. The data historian uses
OPC-UA to query each of the RTUs every three
seconds, returning the same process information as
the IEC104 counterpart. The RTUs are configured to
replicate the OPC profile ‘Nano Embedded Device8’
meaning it is functionally equivalent to the Core
Server Facet and defines the OPC-UA TCP binary
protocol as the required transport profile.
The dataset consists of 9 hosts: 1x HMI; 1x
Data Historian; 5x RTU; 1x MITM Attacker; 1x
Reconnaissance. The Man-in-the-middle (MITM)
attack targets IEC104, which replaces the Cause of
Transmission (COT) value to an invalid value. A time
line of the attack is described:
• [Host-SCAN 13:45]: Basic network reconnais-
sance using a Nmap network wide scan. CMD:
‘nmap -sn 10.50.50.*’
• [Host-SCAN 13:47]: Basic network reconnais-
sance looking for accessible IEC104 servers.
CMD: ‘nmap 10.50.50.* -p 2404’
• [Host-SCAN 13:47]: Full port scan of identified
RTUs nodes. CMD: ‘nmap 10.50.50.101
-105 -A’
8OPC Profile ‘Nano Embedded Device’ https://
opcfoundation-onlineapplications.org/ProfileReporting/
index.htm?ModifyProfile.aspx?ProfileID=
39f0d326-6c45-4f58-b834-3e22a443d8ee
• [Host-SCAN 13:49]: An active IEC104
scan which probes the nodes using the
IEC104 protocol9. CMD: ‘nmap -Pn -n -d
–script iec-identify.nse –script-args=‘iec-
identify.timeout=500’ -p 2404 10.50.50.101-
105’
• [Host-MITM 14:19]: Performs a MITM on
RTU-1 and the HMI. CMD: ‘ettercap -i
enp0s8 -T -M arp -P spoof 104 /10.50.50.101/
/10.50.50.150/’
The MITM attack has been expanded from the work
in Maynard et al. (2014) to support the different
fields used within the IEC104 protocol. Table 2
shows a number of packets per-host, broken down
by the protocol type. This dataset can be used
as an example of how field bus communications
look on the wire. There is a lack of both IEC104
and OPC-UA datasets, many example have a small
amount of packets. Furthermore, the dataset may be
used to verify the effectiveness of a network based
IDS against a SCADA network. While these attacks
can be detected by most traditional IT IDSs, they
represent a SCADA network with a high level of
domain fidelity.
6.1. Deployment Steps
This briefly describes the steps required to deploy
the example testbed.
• Download the framework source code from
github10. Detailed instructions for installing the
dependencies are included in the repository.
9https://github.com/atimorin/PoC2013/blob/master/
iec-60870-5-104/iec-60870-5-104.py
10Framework Repository - https://github.com/PMaynard/
ICS-TestBed-Framework/
99
An Open Framework for Deploying Experimental SCADA Testbed Networks
Maynard • McLaughlin • Sezer
• Modify the operational profile scripts to specify
the number of nodes to build and deploy, along
with what software will be provisioned onto the
node, and network configuration: Connect to
virtual network or physical. Static or Dynamic
IP Address.
• Finally, execute the deployment script which
will start the compilation stage followed by the
orchestration stage.
7. DISCUSSION AND ONGOING WORK
Current work focuses on implementation of addi-
tional operation profiles that would automatically de-
ploy and configure a testbed to represent a specific
use cases. The more of these which are imple-
mented, the better the framework will be able to
enable researching into complex ICS attacks. Also,
the development of additional configuration profiles
for nodes are being undertaken to allow a broader
range of ICS devices to be represented. As much of
the current work focuses on generic devices such as
PLCs and RTUs. The authors are planning to create
operation profiles with a low barrier of entry, yet can
also represent complex systems. One way to accom-
plish this is to use common and cheap components
such as Raspberry Pi, and low end GPS modules
which can be used for temporal based experiments.
This framework is well positioned for experimentation
with new field bus protocols and network paradigms
such as Information Centric Networking11
An interesting future development could be the
configuration of physical network switches, which
may be used to automate the reconfiguration of
Virtual LANs (VLANs) for a specific operational
profile. This could be expanded from there to include
Software Defined Networking (SDN) technology.
Many testbeds do not support remote access, either
due to policy or limited resources. Interconnection
of testbeds is a trend which is becoming popular
in other disciplines. This framework can facilitate an
open decentralised platform for other researchers
to connect and federate. By sharing hardware
resources it would benefit the whole ICS security
community.
Integrating the framework with cloud based hosting,
such as Amazon Web Services (AWS) would allow
for more realistic deployments as nodes can be
located in remote locations. Development of an
intuitive user interface to allow for the easier creation
of complex testbeds could also be of benefit. e.g.
Allow the creation of operation profiles using wiring
and Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&ID),
which would be translated into orchestration stage
configuration scripts.
11ICN https://irtf.org/icnrg
8. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has proposed a flexible and open
framework for creating and deploying virtulised
SCADA testbeds. It has defined eight features
necessary in a SCADA testbed, and compared
the proposed framework against existing testbeds.
The proposed framework contributes to addressing
the lack of modern datasets for use in verifying
experimentation results, and facilitates the ability
to create testbeds that: may have a high degree
of fidelity; are reproducible; can scale well. A 150
minute capture is also provided, that was created
using the framework for use by the wider security
community. This framework provides researchers
with an alternative framework that supports IEC104
and OPC-UA, compared to the more common
Modbus based testbeds, such as Reaves and Morris
(2012). While there is still a number of features that
can be implemented into the framework, it provides
a starting point for future research into ICS testbeds.
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